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Abstract 
The study evaluates the impact of two agricultural input subsidies in Malawi during the 2003/04 and 
2006/07 production periods on household income. The study employs quasi-experimental 
econometric techniques that use propensity score matching to control for selection bias on 
beneficiaries. A household model for each dataset is estimated together with Average Treatment 
Effects on the Treated. The evidence suggest that the matching mechanism performs well in 
evaluating the impact of the starter pack program which had a significant negative impact on 
household income compared to the refined agricultural input subsidy program which showed 
significant positive impacts on household income.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Almost 85% of Malawi’s population belongs to farm (peasant) households and agricultural 
production and productivity are often dependent on their performance as farmers. Malawi 
being a labor intensive country, the importance of these farmers is often undermined and 
understanding the determinants of their welfare, functionality of markets in their communities 
and the interventions that are more effective in improving their livelihoods are of vital 
importance both to Government and policy makers. This approach helps policy makers in 
developing strategies of poverty alleviation that seek to address problems faced by peasant 
farmers.  
However, once such strategies are developed they are faced with lack of sustainability partly 
because there is failure to understand how agrarian institutions work and how to promote 
such agrarian societies up the life cycle ladder. Some of these problems arise due to lack of 
an understanding that peasant households are single institutions where decisions are made 
holistically on production, consumption and reproduction over time (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
1995). These decisions require the functioning of markets within and outside their social 
stratum.  
In this case, one need to understand why households are always semi-commercialized in the 
sense that, even when markets are working, they still keep part of their production for home 
consumption or utilize part of their household labor for their own use. Secondly, on the 
markets, one needs to understand why rural markets fail in forming backward and forward 
linkages to the household entity. As we will see in later sections, the failure to comprehend 
these two important questions necessitates the formulation of poor policies that do not 
maximize the utility of the householder’s social welfare function.  
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The Agricultural Input Subsidy Program in Malawi and Intended Effects 
The goal of the agricultural input subsidy programs in Malawi is to improve agricultural 
production and productivity of smallholder farmers for both food and cash crops thereby 
reducing the vulnerability of food insecurity and hunger. These input subsidy programs have 
been in existence since Malawi attained its independence from Britain in 1964.  
The Starter Pack (TIP) program is one such agricultural input program that was implemented 
from 1998-2004. The program provided 10-15 kg of fertilizers and ample hybrid maize seed, 
free of charge, worthy of planting 0.1 hectares of land. It targeted between 33-96% of rural 
smallholder farmers which was scaled down from being a universal subsidy in 1998/99 to a 
targeted input program in 2003/04 production periods (Harrigan, 2003; Levy, 2005).  
There are variable conclusions concerning the success of the starter pack (TIP) program from 
different researchers and data sources. Real GDP growth in Malawi since 1998 to 2005 has 
been variable averaging 0.5% per annum (see figure 1). Since the backbone of the Malawi 
economy heavily relies on agriculture, the variability in real GDP growth rate signifies the 
failure of the starter pack program in improving agricultural production and productivity.  
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate in Malawi 1998-2004 
 
Source: Malawi Annual Statistics Data 1998-2005 
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Chirwa et al (2006, p. 3) argues that maize production since 1990 has been uneven and 
increasingly disappointing depicting an agricultural growth rate of 2.2% per annum between 
2000 and 2004. Maize prices have also been increasing amid falling and variable maize 
production during the same period (see figure 2).  
Figure 2: Maize Production and Prices (Nominal) in Malawi, 1980-2004 
 
Source: Chirwa (2006) 
Dorward et al (2008), on the other hand, argues that the impact of higher maize prices are a 
dilemma as only about 10% of Malawi maize producers are net sellers of maize while 60% 
are net buyers. Peters (2006) further argues that the success of the starter pack program was 
affected by famine in various parts of the country during the 2001/02 and 2004/05 production 
periods. We argue in this paper that the variability in both real GDP and maize production in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s was partly a result of the small quantities of the starter pack 
program that negatively impacted on maize production and hence affected real GDP growth.  
The 2006/07 input subsidy program, on the other hand, was a continuation from the 2005/06 
revised program that allocated 2 million of improved seed and 3 million fertilizer coupons to 
all districts in Malawi. The distribution of fertilizers initially targeted 1 million marginalized 
farmers that were unable to purchase agricultural inputs. The selection of households in 
targeted areas was done by Village Development Committees (in consultation with the entire 
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members of the village) to select households that would benefit three coupons from the input 
program: two to buy back 50 kg of basal fertilizer (23:21:0 or NPK) and 50 kg of top dressing 
fertilizer (Urea) at MK950, each; and the third coupon to be used in exchange for a 10 kg bag 
of improved maize seed worthy of planting one acre of land. For tobacco smallholder 
farmers, the approach was similar only that they would buy back Compound D and CAN 
fertilizers. These input subsidies for tobacco farmers were only implemented during the 
2005/06 production period.  
However, in this paper we concentrate on maize farmers to compare the differences in 
impacts between the 2003/04 and 2006/07 production periods. As we will notice later on, not 
all beneficiaries in this improved input subsidy program received both coupons for basal and 
top dressing fertilizer. It is reported that there were some significant diversion of coupons in 
some areas whereby households ended up receiving one fertilizer coupon in order to expand 
the number of beneficiaries within a village (Dorward et al, 2008).  
It should be noted at the outset that, amid all these problems faced by the householder, the 
goal of input subsidies in Malawi are mainly meant to increase household income, reduce 
food insecurity and hence poverty reduction. Therefore, assessing the direct impacts of such a 
program on household income or expenditures on the targeted beneficiaries becomes a good 
decision tool for policy makers. Evaluating the complexities beyond the farm gate requires an 
understanding of the transformative and network effects and whether the householder is 
geared towards competing with established businesses such as large scale commercial 
farmers. In most studies, the rural smallholder farmer is always referred to as a subsistence 
farmer (Levy, 2005; Dorward et al, 2008).  
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Study Objectives and Hypotheses to be Tested 
The agricultural system in Malawi is seasonal and several months in a given year are left idle 
and farmers have to seek alternative ways of generating income for their survival. 
Government interventions in this case become very important tools to boost the income of the 
household in lean periods. Government either would initiate a public works program or 
provide safety nets with emphasis on cash transfers to marginalized smallholder households.  
Several evaluations have been conducted to assess the impact of agricultural input subsidy 
programs in Malawi which have either been descriptive/qualitatively inferred (Gregory, 
2006; Dorward et al, 2008; Minot and Benson, 2009) or the econometric methods employed 
have not controlled for any measurement errors or unobserved heterogeneity on the 
beneficiaries (Bohne, 2009; Ricker-Gilbert, 2009).  
The argument in this paper is intended to inform policy makers on the impact of input 
subsidy programs on household income by using quasi-experimental econometric techniques. 
The process adopted estimates a conventional household model to determine the 
effectiveness of two input subsidy programs by controlling for treatment effects. To our 
knowledge, no study has been done that employs such a technique to assess program 
intervention effects of the input subsidy program in Malawi.  
The study objectives, therefore, are twofold. The first one seeks to evaluate government 
interventions using treatment evaluation techniques that focus on evaluating periodic panel 
datasets with the aim of assessing intervention effects on the goal of the agricultural input 
subsidy program. Secondly, to provide quantitative evidence that complementing the input 
subsidy program with programs that seek to address market failures directly impact on 
household income, positively.  
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The second objective aims at assessing other determinants of household income such as 
access to basic services (roads, markets) and how they impact on household income. This 
approach will inform agricultural policy makers of the need to include additional program 
objectives when implementing the next agricultural input subsidy program.  
The key hypotheses to be tested in this paper, therefore, are as follows:  
(a) The 2003/04 starter pack (TIP) program that provided 10-15 kg of fertilizer subsidy 
had a significant negative impact on household incomes.  
(b) The 2006/07 agricultural input subsidy that provided 100 kg worth of fertilizer had a 
significant positive impact on household incomes.  
(c) Access to key basic services such as roads and markets in rural areas negatively 
impact on household income in rural areas.  
The sections of the paper are as follows: section 2 looks at literature review. Section 3 
outlines the methodology to be adopted in this paper. Section 4 looks at results and findings. 
Lastly, section 5 concludes and provides recommendations for future policy interventions.  
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
It has been noted that different researchers often ask the wrong questions and use wrong 
methodologies when assessing agricultural empirical questions that target the poor or less 
privileged in any given society. In any assessment or evaluation of a public intervention 
seeking to improve a given social welfare function of the disadvantaged groups, it is 
important to ask the question whether the targeted beneficiaries were better or worse off after 
the intervention was implemented. It becomes irrelevant, in my view, to consider the cost 
implications of such interventions especially when the intervention proved to be a success.  
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With regard to the second Pareto Optimality principle
1, Government’s role is to redistribute 
wealth and if such distribution is done in a transparent and accountable manner without 
making other players worse off then it would be an added advantage. On the issue of 
methodology, Lalonde (1986) argues that standard non-experimental techniques such as 
regression, fixed effects, and latent-variable selection models are either inaccurate or 
sensitive to model specification. Thus, employing such techniques to assess the impact of an 
intervention may be subjected to measurement errors and selection bias.  
Other researchers have attempted to compare smallholder farmers with commercial farmers 
in which those who received subsidized fertilizers have been compared with yield responses 
of farmers who pay commercial prices (Ricker-Gilbert et. al, 2009). This depicts a lack of 
understanding of how smallholder households behave and a clear eulogy to measurement 
error. According to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), on one hand, smallholder farmers are 
usually semi-commercialized and usually production is at a subsistence level. They only sell 
if they have excess production and this depends on their production and consumption needs. 
Large commercial farmers, on the other hand, rely on markets and have different objectives 
than a rural smallholder subsistence farmer.  
For one to make such a comparative analysis it has to be done at a similar level playing field. 
For instance, access to effective and efficient agricultural extension services, educational 
programs, market and transport systems and credit markets are vital and necessary 
components if we are to compare commercial and smallholder farmers. Commercial farmers 
are usually strategically positioned and can easily access these basic services. They usually 
have access to skilled personnel that are well conversant with latest technologies of 
                                                          
1
 The second theorem of welfare economics states that if all consumers have convex preferences and all firms 
have convex production possibility sets, any Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as the equilibrium of a 
complete set of competitive markets after a suitable redistribution of initial endowments (Gravelle and Rees, 
2004) 
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improving agricultural production unlike rural households that utilize traditional experience 
to perpetuate their agrarian methodologies. As such, utility functions for smallholder and 
commercial farmers are incomparable.  
Therefore, arguments assuming that smallholder farmers who receive subsidized inputs at 
discounted prices through the Government may obtain similar output responses as 
commercial farmers may be an assumption that does not reflect reality. This hypothesis on its 
own is an oversimplification and would lead to gross measurement errors, model 
misspecification and selection bias. This approach would and has always led to the non-
acceptance on the application of input subsidies on marginalized households and thus has 
confused policy makers and development partners of the need to subsidize inputs to the 
underprivileged groups.  
It also follows that a smallholder farmer will only have an incentive to use a productive asset 
as efficiently as possible regardless of the purchasing price if and only if the farmer has 
access to the same conditions faced by commercial farmers. In this case, access to 
knowledge, information and years spent on education become important. Some studies, for 
example, have found that fixed costs (distant to market) and variable costs (price per unit) 
may affect market participation (Key et al, 2000; Bellemare et al, 2006). Others have also 
shown that access to credit and insurance may be constraints being faced by farmers in order 
for them to purchase inputs at reasonable prices (Kherallah et al, 2000; Croppenstedt et al, 
2003; Jayne et al, 2003).  
Another misconception that is frequently being abused is the combination of a social welfare 
function with profit-maximizing behavior. Gregory (2006) argues that input subsidy vouchers 
are an income transfer to the farmer from Government, donor or any other implementing 
agency but also a transfer that can be realized through private sector participation (see also 
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Kelly et al, 2003). This assumption, however, has its own problems and in this paper we 
identify two: firstly, the role of Government is to raise taxes from private entities and 
distribute wealth to marginalized households or communities.  
Since private sector entities are profit driven and liable to additional taxation, the process 
affects the ‘laissez-faire’ assumption of the free operation of market forces and becomes one 
that continuously add transaction costs that become unsustainable rendering the intervention 
too expensive to public coffers. Government comes in to correct a market failure – a failure 
that was created by the private sector in the first place that profiteers a social good.  
Secondly, since other factors such as access to basic services may affect the distribution of 
agricultural inputs to smallholder farmers, the involvement of private sector participants 
creates rent-seeking behavior amongst private players as the business involved is risk-free 
guaranteed by Government thereby adding more on the transaction costs.  
As Shultz (1945) indicates, smallholder farmers in developing countries may be poor but are 
efficient. It, therefore, depends on the quality and quantity of agricultural inputs being 
supplied to the targeted beneficiaries and whether they would have access to the same 
privileges that a normal commercial farmer would receive. Kelly and Murekezi (2000) and 
Duflo et al (2008) also note that application of fertilizer in maize, for example, improves the 
yield if the application is made in right quantities and using the correct methods. In other 
words, the rate of return to fertilizer application is positive but varies by region.  
The other mistake that researchers make is to employ panel data sets which may have been 
developed using different set of conditions. Therefore, any assessment of the impact of 
fertilizer subsidy before and after an intervention is made, for example, cannot be justified by 
looking at different periods or time series but rather creating a counterfactual within the same 
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period and dataset. This reduces potential selection bias by utilizing the same dataset to create 
a control group (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Browyn and Maffioli, 2008).  
As evidenced by Ricker-Gilbert et al (2009), one problem could be that the same respondents 
have different farm size within and between agricultural seasons. Thus, in order to avoid such 
plot-level unobserved heterogeneity, the study considers periodic analysis of each input 
subsidy production period in order to contain for any measurement errors. Recent 
econometric tools are available to make such an assessment and it is this approach that will 
be adopted in this paper in order to assess the effectiveness of public interventions targeting 
the poor. 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
Model Specification 
The main objective of the input subsidy programs before and after 2004/05 was to increase 
agricultural productivity and food security. The overall goal of the program was to promote 
economic growth and reduce vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty. The 
2006/07 Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (AISP) was implemented through the 
distribution of fertilizer vouchers of which the beneficiary had to contribute MK950 per 
voucher of fertilizer and exchange a voucher of seed free of charge. In later years, the 
contribution made by beneficiaries reduced to MK500 during the 2009/10 production period. 
In comparison to the TIP program, targeted smallholder farmers were given all inputs free of 
charge but in small quantities.  
To assess the impact of such interventions in the given seasons or fiscal years, we will 
employ an empirical model on household food security. The model adopts Sadoulet and De 
Janvry (1995) household model with less efficient markets where the household problem is to 
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solve simultaneously allocation of resources between production, consumption and work 
decisions given household characteristics. In its structural form, the household problem is to 
maximize utility  u  with respect to consumption and work decisions subject to a given 
production function  g  and household characteristics:  
 
 ha
h
lma
ccclxq
lxqgts
cccu
lmaa
z
z
,,,      ..           
;,,max
,,,,,

    (1a)
 
In equation (1a), utility is maximized given consumption goods (agricultural goods ac  and 
manufactured goods mc ), home time lc  and household characteristics 
hz  subject to a 
household production function aq   and a set of fixed and variable inputs  lx, . The empirical 
model assumes a linear function and in a reduced form format:  
 LSWCEHPG ,,,,,,,ii yy     (1b) 
In equation (1b), iy  is the outcome of interest – household real expenditure per household 
which is a proxy for household income per capita; G  is a vector of government interventions 
(starter pack program or TIP of 2003/04, agriculture extension services, Agricultural Input 
Subsidy Program of 2006/07); P  is a vector of prices (tobacco auction price, maize grain 
price, maize flour price, fertilizer, casual labor – supply and demand prices, charcoal, 
transport, and price index of other consumables); H  is a vector of household characteristics 
(age, gender, education, health status, sources of lighting and cooking, farm size, livestock 
assets, access to portable water, wellbeing); E  is a vector of economic characteristics 
(market access, distance to market, area of residence, access to road surface); C  is a vector 
of community characteristics (belonging to an association/cooperative, access to agricultural 
credit, irrigation scheme, access to small and large markets): W  is a vector of weather 
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conditions (availability of rain); S  is a vector of seasonal effects (lean period, dry period, 
harvest period, year of interview); and L  is a vector of location effects (agricultural 
division).  
Data Description and Management  
The study utilizes raw household data from the 2004/05 second Integrated Household Survey 
(IHS2) and the 2006/07 Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS). The variables within each 
vector of interest of the household model in equation (1a) and (1b) are calculated and 
averaged over districts. The prices calculated are district level averages from both household 
and community databases. A number of robustness checks are conducted which include 
controlling for outliers, management of duplicate records and conducting principal 
component analysis to create a livestock index.  
Our focus is mainly on rural households since they are more capable of benefiting from the 
agricultural input subsidy program than households that live in urban areas. Using the IHS2 
data out of a sample of 11280, about 9840 households reside in rural areas, which is our point 
of reference. About 60% of households who reside in rural areas reported to have benefited 
from the starter pact (TIP) program compared to 11.6% in urban areas (1440)
2
. The focus on 
rural areas also hinges on the household model employed as we assume that households in 
rural areas are semi-commercialized and thus would expect their behavior to be similar from 
one area to the next.  
A follow-up survey was conducted in May/June 2007 re-interviewing 3,298 households in 
175 EAs. Out of this sample, 2,874 households were previously interviewed in the IHS2 
survey. This dataset will be referred in this study as the AISS. The survey design process was 
the same as the one adopted under IHS2. After controlling for duplicate records, the AISS 
                                                          
2
 IHS2 Survey data 
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sample size was reduced to 2,937 households of which 1,205 households reported to have 
benefited from the input subsidy. Based on this response, 57% reported receiving both 100 kg 
of basal and top dressing fertilizers through the Government’s AISP. The analysis of the 
impact of the AISP will, therefore, be based on respondents who received 100 kg of fertilizer 
based on the goal of the AISP.  
The 2006/07 AISS database has a lot of missing values which constrains the analysis to only 
those variables that can be used to estimate the household model. In order to complement 
some of the missing variables, the study uses 2004/05 IHS2 survey data on some key 
variables such as annual household real expenditure and selected community based variables 
such as access to safe water, electricity, distance to and availability of markets in the 
community, among others. These common variables are assumed to be constant in 2006/07 as 
they were during the 2004/05 IHS2 survey. Annual household real expenditures per capita are 
projected based on real GDP growth rates experienced since 2003/04 to 2006/07 fiscal years 
to match the current household income levels in 2006/07 production season. The impact of 
the AISP will thus be assessed on whether it was effective in positively contributing to 
increased food expenditures in 2006/07 production year.  
Treatment Effects Framework 
The problems assessed in sections 1 and 2 above in evaluating the impact of interventions on 
input subsidies in Malawi warrant different methodologies to be looked into. It is more 
relevant to assess the impact of an intervention based on ‘with or without’ the intervention 
scenario of the sample or population that benefited from the project. As Browyn and Maffioli 
(2008) notes, this provides a rigorous strategy of identifying statistically robust control 
groups on non-participants. Though the ideal evaluation of an intervention necessitates the 
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creation of a treatment or control group, this approach cannot be applied on human beings 
prior to the beginning of the intervention.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose ‘propensity score matching’ (PSM) as a method that 
can be used to measure the impact of interventions on outcomes of interest. Propensity score 
matching is a method used to reduce selection bias in the estimation of treatment or 
intervention effects with observational data sets. The methodology developed is used to 
assess a counterfactual in a given set of observational data just like in any scientific 
experiment where the same sample can be used to assess the impact on the outcome if the 
treatment was not administered. Unlike interventions made on human beings, it is not likely 
that an intervention can be administered in one case and also assess the outcome on the same 
individual if the intervention was not administered, hence the need for propensity score 
matching.  
The effect of treatment evaluation on policy formulation is direct because if an intervention is 
successful it can be linked to desirable social programs or improvements in existing programs 
through reviews. The aim of adopting such a process is to enable policy makers assess the 
objectives or goals of the intervention. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the 
standard problem of treatment evaluation involves the ‘inference of a causal’ connection 
between the treatment and the intended outcome.  
The idea of measuring the effect of a treatment or intervention requires constructing a 
measure that compares the average outcomes of the treated and non-treated groups. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the exposure to treatment or an intervention is 
random within cells defined by the vector ,ix  it is also random within cells defined by the 
15 
 
values of the propensity score. Therefore, given a population or sample of units i  the 
propensity score or the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given ix  is:  
     xxx DEDp  1Pr     (2) 
Once propensity scores are known, we then can calculate the Average effect of Treatment on 
the Treated (ATT) as follows:  
 
   
      1,0,1         
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
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pDyyEE
DyyEATT
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x   (3) 
In equation (3), iy1  assumes the individual receives a treatment or intervention and iy0  is a 
counterfactual if the same (or similar) individual receives no treatment. In its simplest form 
the average treatment effect is estimated simply by subtracting the average outcome for the 
treated with the average outcome for the untreated.  
This hypothesis requires two key assumptions namely: the conditional independence 
assumption and the assumption of unconfoundedness. The first assumption states that 
conditional on ,ix  the outcomes are independent of treatment. In other words, participation 
in the program intervention does not depend on the outcome. The unconfoundedness 
assumption, which in some cases is referred to as the Balancing condition, is necessary if we 
are to identify some population measures of impact (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). Given the overlap or matching assumption in equation (2), the 
independence assumption ensures that for each value of the vector ,ix  there exist both 
treated and non-treated cases. The propensity score measure can be computed given the data 
 iiD x, through either a probit or logit regression.  
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Propensity Score Matching 
The key to the balancing property between the treated and un-treated is to identify 
comparable groups or counterfactual by focusing on key household attributes or 
characteristics. The agricultural input subsidy program mainly focuses on promoting food 
security or household income. The matching methodology calculates propensity scores based 
on the following logit model:  
 poorfhhhhagefTIP ,,      (4) 
The rationale for selecting these household attributes is based on the selection criteria that the 
input subsidy program follows when distributing fertilizer coupons to intended beneficiaries. 
The beneficiaries are considered marginalized and vulnerable and mostly the selection 
criterion is based on whether the householder is headed by a female, regarded as poor or by 
the age variable. Furthermore, the area of residence (rural or urban) is the key identifier of an 
agricultural input subsidy and the focus of analysis will only consider householders that 
reside in rural areas.  
The advantage of the survey data used is that the observations were randomly drawn and thus 
the treatment will not be subjected to a situation where we are unable to identify a control 
group. In the 2006/07 AISS dataset, the creation of a control group takes advantage of the 
distributional problems of the input subsidy program where not all beneficiaries received both 
basal and top-dressing fertilizers. In doing so, we are able to create a control group for the 
treated. However, this may create contamination as the control group still receives fertilizer 
but only the basal type. The bias created may affect the significant difference between the 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Nonetheless, we may not run into such a problem as the 
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yields that a farmer would get by just applying one type of fertilizer are significantly lower 
than yields when both types of fertilizers (basal and top-dressing) are applied.  
Balancing Properties 
One critical area of PSM literature is to assess whether the matching mechanism adopted is 
balanced in the allocated blocks/cells. Fifteen (15) and nine (9) blocks/cells have been created 
for models 1 and 2, respectively. We present tests for equality of means for each of the three 
regressors presented in equation (4) within each block. The results are presented in table 1 
(annex I) and the logit regression in table 2. The results show that all variables are balanced 
in each block and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the differences in mean of the 
treated and controls are different from zero. Thus, the balancing properties when estimating 
propensity scores in both models are satisfied.  
Using calculated propensity scores as defined in equation (2) and (4) is not enough to 
estimate average treatment effects of an intervention (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005; Becker and Ichino, 2009). The reason is that the propensity score is 
usually a continuous variable and the probability of observing two units with exactly the 
same propensity score is in principle not possible. A number of methodologies have been 
proposed in the literature with the aim of overcoming this problem (see Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). In this evaluation exercise, however, we will consider only four most common 
methods widely used: nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, kernel matching and 
stratification (or interval) matching
3
.  
We plot density functions for the treated and control groups to see whether the matching of 
scores is over a reasonable number of observations. The probability density functions for the 
                                                          
3
 Details on how these matching estimators are calculated can be found in Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.871-
879 
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propensity scores are displayed in figures 3, 4 and 5 (annex II) for models 1 and 2, 
respectively, obtained from    and , , attkattrattnd STATA commands. The results show that 
the mean propensity score between the treated and control group is well distributed in both 
models. The distribution of treatment also performs well when one uses radius and kernel 
matching techniques.  
4.0 MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
Robustness Checks 
Table 3 (annex III) present robustness checks on the data for the two models to be estimated. 
We first check whether the models have no omitted variables. We use the Ramsey RESET 
test using powers of the fitted values of the food expenditure dependent variable. The results 
show that the two models are affected by omitted variables. Since the two datasets are limited 
on the number of variables that can be generated from each database, we still estimate the 
models given the present variables.  
On functional form and heteroskedasticity, we use Cameron and Trivedi decomposition of 
the IM test that tests for heteroskedasticity, skewness and kurtosis. The results for both 
models suggest that there are problems of heteroskedasticity and skewness. We will 
therefore, use weighted least squares and a log-linearised model to correct for skewness.  
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Welsberg test is used to test for overall heteroskedasticity in the 
two models and the results show that both models are affected by heteroskedasticity. This 
further substantiates the need to report Huber/White heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors.  
We test for multicollinearity on the variables of interest using variance inflation factors 
(VIF). In both models there is evidence of multicollinearity and the variables with a high 
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variance inflation factor (VIF) are dropped. One common variable in both equations is the 
square of household age.   
A new regression model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and corrected based 
on problems identified by the above common misspecification tests. We also test for 
endogeneity and the results show that the model suffers from an endogeneity problem and 
one of the suspected parameters is the household age variable (hhage) which has a positive 
sign as we would expect that as age of an individual increases, the propensity of being food 
insecure is high.  
We, therefore, should expect a negative sign for the household age variable. In this case we 
expect that the household age variable is correlated with the error term or there is a 
measurement error being influenced by a reverse causation of the dependent variable. In this 
case, the two models may present biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.  
Instrumental Variables 
To correct our problem we identify an instrumental variable for the household age variable in 
order to obtain consistent estimates. A good instrument is one that is correlated with the 
endogenous household age variable, conditional on other covariates, but also at the same time 
not correlated with the error term. We follow this process in identifying the instrumental 
variable for hhage and test the correlation coefficients between hhage and three related 
exogenous variables – elderly, madult and fadult. The correlation coefficients are presented in 
table 4 (annex III) and show that the elderly variable is strongly correlated with hhage 
(0.6382, model 1; 0.5405 model 2) and has a strong significant p-value.  
We further test the validity of the selected instrumental variable (elderly) and the results are 
presented in table 3. The results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
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elderly variable is exogenous in both models (p-values 0.2812 and 0.9032) and hence not 
correlated with the error term. In this case, the elderly variable is a good instrument for the 
hhage variable. The model to be estimated will, therefore, follow two stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation to provide consistent parameter estimates.  
Regression Results 
The results for the estimated instrumental variable or 2SLS models are presented in tables 5 
and 6 (see annex IV) together with the estimated average treatment effects on the treated (or 
ATT) for the input subsidy intervention based on Becker and Ichino (2009) algorithms. The 
goodness of fit shows that in the first model using IHS2 data the explanatory variables 
explain about 33% of the variation on the dependent variable and 27% in the second 
household model.  
Tables 7 and 8 (see annex V) present an average propensity score difference estimator 
between the treated and the control group based on equation (3) and show the number of 
treated and control groups for each matching mechanism adopted. The ATT estimators 
presented in tables 7 and 8 are average treatment effects based on all blocks/cells created as 
outlined in table 9 (annex VI). We now present the regression results based on the hypotheses 
to be tested.  
Hypothesis 1: Impact of the 2003/04 Starter Pack (TIP) Program on 
Household Income 
After controlling for complex survey design and 2SLS estimation, the results show that those 
who benefited from the Starter Pack (TIP) program, holding other factors constant, had a 
significant negative impact of approximately 0.0819 (8.2%) or reduced annual household 
income per capita by MK1399.00 (1399 Malawi Kwacha).  
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Overall the results obtained after controlling for treatment effects (nearest neighbor, radius, 
kernel matching and stratification) taken together, also give evidence of a significant negative 
treatment effect in the ranges of MK1228-MK2521 associated with the TIP subsidy when 
evaluated with control or comparison groups, ceteris paribus. Note that the ATT results are 
close to the coefficient estimate for the TIP impact given in our household model of 
MK1399
4
.  
The results are not surprising and concur with evaluations made by government and some 
researchers on the impact of the TIP subsidy as not being effective in reducing poverty and 
food insecurity (Dorward et al 2008; Ricker-Gilbert et al 2009). The size of the package 
distributed to targeted households contributed significantly to the negative impact as well as 
corrupt practices identified by Peters (2006). It is more likely that the application of fertilizers 
were done to fit a householder’s farm size that was more than 0.1 hectares. In such 
circumstances, yield would generally be low or equivalent to a situation where no fertilizers 
are applied to a particular field. This could have been necessitated by poor extension services 
that did not advise targeted farmers on how to apply the subsidized fertilizer.  
Hypothesis 2: Impact of 2006/07 Agricultural Input Subsidy Program on 
Household Income 
The second household model results (table 6) show that those who benefited from the full 
subsidy of the AISP, holding other things constant, had a significant positive contribution of 
0.082 (8.2%) or MK1679 more towards household income than those who did not benefit 
from the AISP. Overall, the results obtained after controlling for ATT also give significant 
evidence (except the ATTR) on the effect of treatment on the beneficiaries. Those who 
received a full subsidy from Government, ceteris paribus, experienced a positive impact in 
                                                          
4
 Note that the coefficient estimates in log-terms for annual household real expenditure per capita are 
transformed using the exponential function and obtain the difference between the treated and untreated.  
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the ranges of MK1567-MK1705 (ATT of 0.075-0.083) associated with the 2006/07 AISP 
when evaluated without the intervention comparison group. Again the results support 
observations by other researchers about the positive impact that the revised agricultural input 
subsidy program had on household incomes and in reducing food security in Malawi 
(Dorward et al, 2008).  
Hypothesis 3: Impact of Basic Services on Household Income 
The study also evaluated the impact of market access on annual household income per capita. 
Three key variables were included in each household model that looked at the impact of 
roads, market access and distance to the market on household income. The study results are 
similar in both models and show that those who had access to large markets, holding other 
things constant, had a significant negative impact of 0.1218 (or 12.2%) and 0.154 (or 15.4%), 
in 2003/04 and 2006/07 production periods, respectively, than those who did not. This is 
surprising as one would expect that farmers with better access to large markets would be 
better off than those who do not. The reason is that these markets are secondary markets and 
are far away from main markets in the three cities in the country. As such, farm gate prices 
tend to be below the smallholder farmer’s long-run marginal cost curve in rural areas.  
This also concurs with the fact that lack of or existence of poor basic services such as markets 
in rural areas greatly affect household production and consumption decisions (see Dorward et 
al, 2008 and Chirwa et al, 2006). This is supported by the negative impact that distances to 
markets have on household income and registered -0.0022 (or -0.22%, significant at 1% 
level) during 2003/04 and -0.0019 (or -0.2%) during the 2006/07 production seasons, ceteris 
paribus.  
As for roads, during the 2003/04 production season the variable of interest was dropped due 
to multicollinearity. During the 2006/07 production season, however, the road variable 
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registered, ceteris paribus, a significant negative impact of 0.163 (or 16.3%) for communities 
that had access to only a dirt road maintained on a regular basis. Unpaved roads usually raise 
transportation costs and thus lower farm gate prices as intermediate buyers have to cover their 
marginal costs. This also supports the argument of the need to improve basic services in rural 
areas in order to lower transaction costs and maximize the benefits from any social program 
through proper marketing mechanisms.  
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The paper has demonstrated on how we can use treatment effects to evaluate the impact of 
public interventions based on independent datasets. The study has also employed algorithms 
developed by Becker and Ichino (2009) to assess input subsidy effects on household food 
expenditures. The main conclusions from this study can be summarized as follows: the 
impact of the input subsidy programs in Malawi becomes stronger as policy makers improve 
on the quantities of inputs subsidized. The benefits can further be maximized if such 
programs are complemented with projects aimed at improving access to basic services in the 
targeted areas such as roads and markets.  
There is clear evidence of a significant negative impact of the 2003/04 Starter Pack (TIP) 
program and significant positive impact of the AISP on household income when we use 
treatment effects. The differences are a result of Government improving on the quantities of 
fertilizer used by smallholder farmers and improving on the distribution to marginalized 
beneficiaries. The adopted approach is important as it controls for selection bias that may 
result from measurement errors and model misspecification.  
Access to basic services in rural areas such as large markets and unpaved roads negatively 
impact on the availability of household income. We conclude that interventions geared 
towards complementing input subsidies should be supported with interventions aimed at 
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improving basic services such as the development of markets and roads in rural areas. In 
concluding, we offer a few recommendations based on the results obtained in this study when 
assessing the impact of input subsidies in Malawi or any other program intervention aimed at 
improving national economic growth and poverty reduction. Some of the recommendations 
are based on weaknesses envisaged when evaluating the two NSO survey datasets in this 
study.  
In order to effectively, efficiently, independently and successfully evaluate public 
interventions the following recommendations should be adopted by program implementers 
and collectors of national statistical data:  
i) Relevant tracking mechanisms should be adopted to collect primary data on key variables 
that would be affected by the intervention in question. In most cases a household model 
would be the best starting point of determining the type of information to be tracked and 
how that dependent variable will be affected by the intervention in question.  
ii) In order to assess the impact of public interventions effectively and independently it is 
important that implementers of such programs should link up with the National Statistical 
Office personnel in country in order to formulate the type of questions to be tracked as 
they may provide a ‘low cost’ independent platform of collecting the same information by 
simply including specific ‘program intervention’ sections on existing questionnaires that 
they randomly collect.  
iii) Follow-up surveys conducted by the National Statistical Office should promote the 
continuance collection of original questionnaire variables collected in the Integrated 
Household Survey or at least tracking of common variables relevant to household 
characteristics in order to be able to evaluate the impact of a specific intervention based 
on the household model. This observation is based on the different sets of variables that 
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were collected in the 2006/07 follow-up survey on assessing the impact of agricultural 
input subsidies in Malawi that were different from the original IHS2 survey.  
Finally, the study also encountered some problems that are beyond its scope. We did not run 
into any significant problems of missing data with the IHS2 database but were significant in 
the follow-up 2006/07 panel survey. This may have affected the consistency of the results 
obtained when running the second household model.  
  
26 
 
6.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Becker, S. O., and A. Ichino (2009), ‘Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Based on 
Propensity Scores’, available at www2.dse.unibo.it/ichino/psj7.pdf   
Bellemare, M., C. Barrett (2006), ‘An Ordered Tobit Model of Market Participation: 
Evidence from Kenya and Ethiopia’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
88(2): 324-337 
Bohne, A. (2009), ‘Agriculture, Agricultural Income and Rural Poverty in Malawi: Spatial 
analysis of determinants and differences’, working paper available at http://www.uni-
koeln.de/phil-fak/afrikanistik/kant/data/Bohne-KANT2.pdf 
Browyn, H., and A. Maffioli (2008), ‘Evaluating the Impact of Technology Development 
Funds in Emerging Economies: evidence from Latin America,’ a Technical Report 
available at http://hd1.handle.net/10086/15999  
Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
Chirwa, E. W., J. Kydd and A. Dorward (2006), ‘Future Scenarios for Agriculture in Malawi: 
Challenges and dilemmas’, draft version, March, available at http://www.future-
agricultures.org/pdf%20files/Ag_Malawi.pdf 
Croppenstedt, A., M. Demke, M. Meschi (2003), ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of 
Constraints: The Case of Fertilizer Demand in Ethiopia’, Review of Development 
Economics, 7(1): 58-70 
Dehejia, R. H., and S. Wahba (1999), ‘Causal Effects in Non-Experimental Studies: re-
evaluating the evaluation of training programs’, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 94, 1053-1062  
Dorward, A., E. Chirwa, V. Kelly, T. S. Jayne, R. Slater, and D. Boughton (2008), 
‘Evaluation of the 2006/07 Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, Malawi’, Final 
Report, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Lilongwe: March 
Duflo, E., M. Kremer, J. Robinson (2008), ‘How High are Rates of Return to Fertilizer? 
Evidence from Field Experiments in Kenya’, American Economics Association 
Meetings, New Orleans, Los Angeles: January 
Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), ‘Microeconomics’, Third Edition, Edinburgh Gate: Pearson 
Education Limited 
Gregory, I. (2006), ‘The Role of Input Vouchers in Pro-Poor Growth’, Background Paper 
Prepared for the African Fertilizer Summit, Abuja, Nigeria: June 9-13 
Harrigan, J. (2003), ‘U-Turns and Full Circles: Two decades of agricultural reform in Malawi 
1981-2000’, World Development, Vol. 31(5), 847-863 
27 
 
Jayne, T. S., J. Govereh, M. Wanzala, M. Demke (2003), ‘Fertilizer Market Development: a 
comparative analysis of Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia’, Food Policy: 28(4): 293-326 
Kelly, V. and A. Mukerezi (2000), ‘Fertilizer Response and Profitability in Rwanda’, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry, Kigali, Rwanda: February 
Key, N., E. Sadoulet, A. de Janvry (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and Agricultural Household 
Supply Response’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(5): 245-259 
Kherallah, M., C. Delgado, E. Gabre-Madhin, N. Minot, M. Johnson (2000), ‘Agricultural 
Market Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: a synthesis of research findings’, Washington 
D. C.: International Food Policy Research Institute 
Levy, S., (2005), Starter Packs: A strategy to fight hunger in developing countries? 
Wallingford, UK: CABI publishing 
Minot, N. and T. Benson (2009), ‘Fertilizer Subsidies in Africa: Are vouchers the answer?’, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI Issue Brief 60: July 
Peters, P. E. (2006), ‘Rural Income and Poverty in a Time of Radical Change in Malawi’, 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 42(2), 322-345 
Ricker-Gilbert J., T. S. Jayne and J. R. Black (2009), ‘Does Subsidizing Fertilizer Increase 
Yields? Evidence from Malawi’, Selected paper prepared for presentation at the 
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 2009 AAEA and ACCI Joint Annual 
Meeting, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 26-29, 2009 
Rosenbaum, P., and D. B. Rubin (1983), ‘The Central Role of Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects,’ Biometrika, 70, 227-240 
Rostow, W. W. (1963). The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth: Proceedings of a 
Conference held by the International Economic Association. W. W. Rostow (ed.), 
London: Macmillan. 
Sadoulet, E., and A. de Janvry (1995), ‘Quantitative Development Policy Analysis’, 
Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press 
Schultz, T. W. (1945), Food for the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
 
 
28 
 
7.0 ANNEXES 
Annex I: Two Sample t-tests for Mean Propensity Score and Logit 
Regression Results 
Table 1: Two Sample t-test with Equal Variances 
H0:Mean Propensity Score not different for treated and controls 
  Variable Name Block  Difference estimate t-statistic p-value 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Mean pscore 8   0.002         
  9 0.000 -0.002 -0.31 -1.40 0.76 0.18 
  10 0.000 -0.002 -0.86 -0.74 0.39 0.46 
  11 -0.001 0.002 -1.61 1.27 0.11 0.21 
  12 -0.001 -0.002 -1.84 -0.84 0.07 0.41 
  13 -0.001 -0.001 -1.73 -0.29 0.08 0.77 
  14 -0.001 0.001 -1.93   0.05   
  15 0.001 -0.001 1.15 -1.12 0.25 0.26 
  16 0.000 -0.020 0.35 -1.66 0.73 0.10 
  17 -0.001   -1.65   0.10   
  18 0.000   -0.14   0.89   
  19 -0.001   -0.95   0.34   
  20 0.000   0.47   0.64   
  21 0.000   -0.32   0.75   
  22 0.000   0.06   0.95   
  23 -0.003   -0.96   0.34   
hhage 8   2.800         
  9 -0.140 -2.221 -0.72 -1.40 0.48 0.18 
  10 -0.115 -2.594 -1.00 -0.75 0.32 0.46 
  11 -0.157 1.843 -1.25 1.27 0.21 0.21 
  12 -0.184 -0.132 -1.57 -0.05 0.12 0.96 
  13 -0.192 -0.595 -1.47 -0.28 0.14 0.78 
  14 -0.101 0.600 -0.60   0.55   
  15 -0.006 -1.152 -0.03 -1.13 0.98 0.26 
  16 0.042 -2.208 0.21 -1.66 0.84 0.10 
  17 -0.346   -1.59   0.11   
  18 -0.203   -0.73   0.46   
  19 -0.119   -0.46   0.65   
  20 0.477   1.45   0.15   
  21 -0.399   -0.89   0.37   
  22 -0.065   -0.11   0.91   
  23 -1.072   -0.82   0.42   
fhh 8   0.000         
  9 0.017 0.000 0.75   0.45   
  10 0.011 0.000 0.59   0.56   
  11 0.015 0.000 0.61   0.54   
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H0:Mean Propensity Score not different for treated and controls 
  Variable Name Block  Difference estimate t-statistic p-value 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
  12 0.010 -0.038 0.59 -0.59 0.56 0.55 
  13 0.005 0.000 0.31 0.00 0.76 1.00 
  14 -0.011 0.000 -0.41   0.68   
  15 0.019 0.000 0.64   0.52   
  16 0.001 0.000 0.02   0.99   
  17 0.029   0.89   0.38   
  18 0.035   0.75   0.46   
  19 -0.011   -0.31   0.76   
  20 -0.076   -1.37   0.17   
  21 0.060   0.83   0.41   
  22 0.015   0.23   0.82   
  23 0.022   0.15   0.88   
poor 8   0.000         
  10   0.000         
  11   0.000         
  12   0.038   0.59   0.55 
  13   0.000   0.00   1.00 
  14   0.000         
  15   0.000         
  16   0.000         
 
Table 2: Logit Estimates for Mean Propensity Score if Householder Resides in Rural Area  
Model 1   Model 2   
  TIP   aissf 
hhage 0.0271 hhage 0.0040 
  (0.00)***   (0.31) 
fhh 0.1463 fhh -0.4596 
  (0.01)**   (0.00)** 
  
 
poor -0.6821 
  
 
  (0.00)*** 
_cons -0.7612 _cons 0.3336 
  (0.00)***   (0.08) 
N 9573 N 1171 
pR-sq 0.035 pR-sq 0.022 
Note: Balancing property is satisfied 
Marginal Effects; t-statistics in parenthesis 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex II: Probability Density Functions for Propensity Scores 
Figure 3: Density Function for Mean Propensity Score 
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Figure 4: Model 1 
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Figure 5: Model 2 
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Annex III: Robustness Checks 
Table 3: Robustness Checks on Survey Data if Householder Resides in Rural Area 
Robustness Checks Null Hypothesis Statistic Model 1: Model 2: Conclusion 
Ramsey RESET test using powers 
of the fitted values of dependent 
variable 
Model has no 
omitted variables 
F-statistic 89.96 84.17 Reject null hypothesis. 
However dataset has 
limited observations 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Functional Form and 
Heteroskedasticity using Cameron 
and Trivedi decomposition of IM-
test 
Heteroskedasticity p-value 0.0000 0.0000 Reject but not for kurtosis. 
For skewness transform 
dependent variable to log 
form 
Skewness p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Kurtosis p-value 1.0000 1.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Welsberg 
test for heteroskedasticity 
constant variance 
chi2 9244.36 4086.77 Reject & report 
Huber/White het-consistent 
standard errors: weighted 
least squares 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for Multicollinearity using 
Variance Inflation Factors 
No Multicollinearity mean VIF 20.01 4.56 
Drop some variables in 
both models and form 
principal components 
Test for Endogeneity 
Variables are 
exogenous 
Robust Score chi2 7.72236 14.3377 reject null hypothesis and 
variables are endogenous 
p-value 0.0055 0.0002 
Test of Linear Hypothesis 
Variables are 
exogenous (elderly) 
F-statistic 0.38 0.01 
Instrumental variable is 
exogenous p-value 0.5400 0.9032 
 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients to Determine Instrumental Variable for Household Age (Reside=Rural) 
Model 1 
    
Model 2 
    
 
hhage elderly madult fadult 
 
hhage elderly madult fadult 
hhage 1.0000 
   
hhage 1.0000 
   
          
elderly 0.6395 1.0000 
  
elderly 0.5405 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 
    
0.0000 
   
madult -0.0583 -0.2266 1.0000 
 
madult -0.0382 -0.2371 1.0000 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
   
0.0388 0.0000 
  
fadult 0.0037 -0.2014 0.2413 1.0000 fadult -0.0119 -0.2200 0.2288 1.0000 
 
0.7169 0.0000 0.0000 
  
0.5204 0.0000 0.0000 
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Annex IV: OLS Estimates of Household Model (Dependent Variable: 
Annual Household real expenditure per Capita)  
Table 5: Regression Results on Model 1 with ATT5 if Householder Resides in Rural Area 
  IV Estimation   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc 
TIP -0.0819 -1399 -0.087 -1488 -0.071 -1228 -0.076 -1303 -0.143 -2521 
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   
agext -0.1423   0.3016   0.3016   0.3016       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
agextcp -0.0705   0.2891   0.2891   0.2891       
 
(0.26)   (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.19)       
agextsv 0.0152   0.1302   0.1302   0.1302       
 
(0.76)   (0.55)   (0.55)   (0.55)       
agextfu 0.0619   0.2018   0.2018   0.2018       
 
(0.36)   (0.36)   (0.36)   (0.36)       
agextirri -0.0274   0.3917   0.3917   0.3917       
 
(0.46)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
agextac 0.0349   -0.1042   -0.1042   -0.1042       
 
(0.38)   (0.55)   (0.55)   (0.55)       
agextmkt -0.0250   -0.0768   -0.0768   -0.0768       
 
(0.55)   (0.66)   (0.66)   (0.66)       
agextcre 0.0257   -0.0268   -0.0268   -0.0268       
 
(0.53)   (0.87)   (0.87)   (0.87)       
p_tobauction 0.0003   0.0068   0.0068   0.0068       
 
(0.93)   (0.45)   (0.45)   (0.45)       
p_maize 0.0119   0.0794   0.0794   0.0794       
 
(0.16)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
p_fert 0.0129   -0.0133   -0.0133   -0.0133       
 
(0.00)**   (0.17)   (0.17)   (0.17)       
p_ganyu -0.0023   -0.0945   -0.0945   -0.0945       
 
(0.84)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
p_index 0.0010   -0.0352   -0.0352   -0.0352       
 
(0.91)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)       
p_char 0.0041   -0.0033   -0.0033   -0.0033       
 
(0.00)***   (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.19)       
p_ker -0.0022   0.0679   0.0679   0.0679       
 
(0.85)   (0.03)*   (0.03)*   (0.03)*       
p_tpt 0.0013   -0.0137   -0.0137   -0.0137       
 
(0.41)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
p_mflour -0.0151   0.1310   0.1310   0.1310       
                                                          
5
 Second column presents results based on instrumental variable or 2SLS using complex survey design. 
Columns 4-10 presents Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) using propensity scores – 4
th
 column: 
ATT ( Nearest Neighbor matching); 6
th
 Column: ATT (Radius matching); 8
th
 Column: ATT (Kernel matching); 10
th
 
Column: ATT (Stratification matching) 
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  IV Estimation   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc 
 
(0.61)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)       
p_dwage 0.0024   0.0324   0.0324   0.0324       
 
(0.65)   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
hhageiv -0.0040 
 
0.0272   0.0272   0.0272       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
fadult -0.1779   0.2257   0.2257   0.2257       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
madult -0.0548   0.1471   0.1471   0.1471       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
mlgtp 0.1043   0.1289   0.1289   0.1289       
 
(0.00)***   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)       
mlgte 0.6322   -1.5507   -1.5507   -1.5507       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
mcooke 0.4879   0.3412   0.3412   0.3412       
 
(0.00)***   (0.60)   (0.60)   (0.60)       
mcookf 0.1014   0.0890   0.0890   0.0890       
 
(0.12)   (0.68)   (0.68)   (0.68)       
mcookc 0.6286   -0.7236   -0.7236   -0.7236       
 
(0.00)***   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)       
fhh 0.0300   0.2815   0.2815   0.2815       
 
(0.14)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
yrsed 0.0269   -0.0579   -0.0579   -0.0579       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
inter 0.0073   -0.0280   -0.0280   -0.0280       
 
(0.10)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)       
illness 0.0565   0.1426   0.1426   0.1426       
 
(0.00)***   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
farmszpc 0.5498   0.4367   0.4367   0.4367       
 
(0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
l_index 0.0218   -0.0506   -0.0506   -0.0506       
 
(0.00)***   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
water 0.2176   -0.2552   -0.2552   -0.2552       
 
(0.00)***   (0.04)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*       
wbeing 0.1507   -0.0005   -0.0005   -0.0005       
 
(0.00)***   (0.99)   (0.99)   (0.99)       
distmkt -0.0022   0.0050   0.0050   0.0050       
 
(0.03)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*       
roadbin1 0.0351   -0.0652   -0.0652   -0.0652       
 
(0.36)   (0.50)   (0.50)   (0.50)       
agcredit 0.1093   -0.1532   -0.1532   -0.1532       
 
(0.00)**   (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.08)       
coop 0.0004   0.1856   0.1856   0.1856       
 
(0.99)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)       
irriscm -0.0525   -0.1567   -0.1567   -0.1567       
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  IV Estimation   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc 
 
(0.23)   (0.22)   (0.22)   (0.22)       
mktsmall -0.0203   -0.0583   -0.0583   -0.0583       
 
(0.44)   (0.43)   (0.43)   (0.43)       
mktlarge -0.1218   0.3662   0.3662   0.3662       
 
(0.00)**   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
rain_l -0.0546   0.2428   0.2428   0.2428       
 
(0.09)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
rain_m 0.0397   0.0330   0.0330   0.0330       
 
(0.26)   (0.64)   (0.64)   (0.64)       
season1 -0.1726   -0.0494   -0.0494   -0.0494       
 
(0.00)***   (0.58)   (0.58)   (0.58)       
season2 -0.1123   0.0893   0.0893   0.0893       
 
(0.00)***   (0.21)   (0.21)   (0.21)       
season4 -0.1361   -0.1119   -0.1119   -0.1119       
 
(0.00)***   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)       
year2004 0.1545   0.1185   0.1185   0.1185       
 
(0.00)***   (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.12)       
_cons 8.3034 
 
3.2734   3.2734   3.2734       
 
(0.00)***   (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.16)       
N 7890   7890   7890   7890   9573   
R-sq 0.325   0.072   0.072   0.072       
Marginal Effects; t-statistics in parenthesis 
       (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
      ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Table 6: Regression Results on Model 2 with ATT
6
 if Householder Resides in Rural Area 
  IV Estimation   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 2 lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc 
aissf 0.0821 1679 0.078 1605 0.075 1567 0.083 1705 0.073 1587 
 
(0.02)*   (0.07)   (0.30)   (0.01)**   (0.02)*   
agextsv -0.1424   0.6203   0.6203   0.6203       
 
(0.24)   (0.21)   (0.21)   (0.21)       
agextfu 0.2010   -0.6444   -0.6444   -0.6444       
 
(0.11)   (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.20)       
p_lmaize -0.0055   0.0656   0.0656   0.0656       
 
(0.65)   (0.03)*   (0.03)*   (0.03)*       
p_hmaize 0.0170   -0.1011   -0.1011   -0.1011       
 
(0.46)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)       
p_tobacco 0.0041   -0.0157   -0.0157   -0.0157       
 
(0.15)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
p_wage 0.0012   0.0144   0.0144   0.0144       
 
(0.52)   (0.00)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**       
hhageiv -0.0033 
 
0.0084   0.0084   0.0084       
 
(0.08)   (0.27)   (0.27)   (0.27)       
madult -0.0626   0.1876   0.1876   0.1876       
 
(0.00)**   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
fadult -0.1469   0.2184   0.2184   0.2184       
 
(0.00)***   (0.03)*   (0.03)*   (0.03)*       
mlgtp 0.1631   0.3053   0.3053   0.3053       
 
(0.01)*   (0.21)   (0.21)   (0.21)       
mlgte 1.0610   0.8316   0.8316   0.8316       
 
(0.00)***   (0.40)   (0.40)   (0.40)       
mcooke -0.0803   -1.2166   -1.2166   -1.2166       
 
(0.75)   (0.37)   (0.37)   (0.37)       
mcookf -0.0885   -0.2248   -0.2248   -0.2248       
 
(0.59)   (0.73)   (0.73)   (0.73)       
mcookc 0.1420   
 
  
 
  
 
      
 
(0.52)   
 
  
 
  
 
      
fhh 0.0372   -0.3711   -0.3711   -0.3711       
 
(0.28)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
consyr -0.0139   -0.2343   -0.2343   -0.2343       
 
(0.67)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)       
l_index 0.0316   0.1717   0.1717   0.1717       
 
(0.09)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
water 0.0673   0.1215   0.1215   0.1215       
 
(0.60)   (0.70)   (0.70)   (0.70)       
distmkt -0.0019   -0.0023   -0.0023   -0.0023       
 
(0.35)   (0.71)   (0.71)   (0.71)       
mktsmall 0.0694   0.0143   0.0143   0.0143       
                                                          
6
 Note that those in parenthesis for ATT are t-statistics.  
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  IV Estimation   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 2 lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc lrexppc rexppc 
 
(0.23)   (0.93)   (0.93)   (0.93)       
mktlarge -0.1542   0.2436   0.2436   0.2436       
 
(0.04)*   (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.20)       
roadbin1 0.1006   -0.3673   -0.3673   -0.3673       
 
(0.38)   (0.26)   (0.26)   (0.26)       
roadbin3 -0.1629   -0.5443   -0.5443   -0.5443       
 
(0.03)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
roadbin4 -0.1153   0.1951   0.1951   0.1951       
 
(0.23)   (0.49)   (0.49)   (0.49)       
ADMARC -0.0602   -0.2030   -0.2030   -0.2030       
 
(0.40)   (0.34)   (0.34)   (0.34)       
farmszpc 0.5796   0.1514   0.1514   0.1514       
 
(0.00)***   (0.51)   (0.51)   (0.51)       
wbeing -0.0640   -0.1661   -0.1661   -0.1661       
 
(0.10)   (0.32)   (0.32)   (0.32)       
poor -0.0832   -0.5602   -0.5602   -0.5602       
 
(0.03)*   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
coop -0.0100   0.5246   0.5246   0.5246       
 
(0.88)   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
irriscm -0.1202   -0.3664   -0.3664   -0.3664       
 
(0.13)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)       
ICT -0.0698   -0.8016   -0.8016   -0.8016       
 
(0.64)   (0.43)   (0.43)   (0.43)       
_cons 9.3445 
 
-0.1758   -0.1758   -0.1758       
 
(0.00)***   (0.91)   (0.91)   (0.91)       
N 1147 N 1143   1143   1143   1176   
R-sq 0.270 pR-sq 0.066   0.066   0.066       
Marginal Effects; t-statistics in parenthesis 
       (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
      ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex V: ATT and Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
Table 7: ATT and Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Model 1 based on IHS2 Dataset 
ATTND 
      ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version) 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
       Mean Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.705 16397 4748       
Matched Controls 9.792 17885 1903       
ATT (y1-y0) -0.087 -1488 6651 0.021 -4.244 0.000 
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual nearest neigbor matches 
       ATTR 
      ATT estimation with the Radius Matching method 
   Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated Mean Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.726 16752 2961       
Matched Controls 9.797 17980 2281       
ATT (y1-y0) -0.071 -1228 5242 0.024 -2.971 0.000 
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual matches within radius 
       ATTK 
      ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
   Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.705 16397 4748       
Matched Controls 9.781 17700 3139       
ATT (y1-y0) -0.076 -1303 7887 0.013 -6.027 0.000 
       ATTS 
      ATT estimation with the Stratification Matching method 
  Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.705 16397 5754       
Matched Controls 9.848 18918 3814       
ATT (y1-y0) -0.143 -2521 9568 0.014 -10.601 0.000 
       IV Estimation 
      No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Treated 9.705 16397 687       
Untreated 9.787 17796 518       
y1-y0 -0.082 -1399 1205 0.016 -5.030 0.000 
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Table 8: ATT and Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Model 2 using AISS Dataset 
ATTND 
      ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version) 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
       Mean Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.966 21297 651       
Matched Controls 9.888 19692 272       
ATT (y1-y0) 0.078 1605 923 0.052 1.498 0.0672 
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual nearest neigbor matches 
       ATTR 
      ATT estimation with the Radius Matching method 
   Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated Mean Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.979 21575 106       
Matched Controls 9.904 20008 102       
ATT (y1-y0) 0.075 1567 208 0.151 0.499 0.3092 
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual matches within radius 
       ATTK 
      ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
   Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.966 21297 651       
Matched Controls 9.883 19592 491       
ATT (y1-y0) 0.083 1705 1142 0.032 2.589 0.0049 
       ATTS 
      ATT estimation with the Stratification Matching method 
  Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
     No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Matched Treated 9.966 21297 672       
Matched Controls 9.889 19709 494       
ATT (y1-y0) 0.077 1587 1166 0.036 2.159 0.0155 
       IV Estimation 
      No. Treated ATT Abs. Mean Observations Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Treated 9.966 21297 687       
Untreated 9.884 19618 518       
y1-y0 0.082 1679 1205 0.002 2.460 0.02 
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Annex VI: Blocks/Cells for Treated and Control Groups 
Table 9: Inferior Bound, Number of Treated and Controls for Each Block (Reside==Rural) 
Model 1 
    
Model 2 
   
Inferior of 
block of 
pscore 
Householder received a 
Starter Pack (TIP) as 
safety net from 
Government 
  
Inferior of 
block of 
pscore 
Householder received both 
basal and top dressing 
subsidy fertilizers 
 
 
No Yes Total 
  
No Yes Total 
0.4 58 33 91   0.325 5 1 6 
0.45 167 108 275   0.3375 8 13 21 
0.4625 256 205 461   0.35 32 16 48 
0.475 535 504 1039   0.4 36 27 63 
0.5 883 1040 1923   0.45 67 64 131 
0.55 338 394 732   0.5 79 79 158 
0.575 287 435 722   0.55 1 5 6 
0.6 404 678 1082   0.6 248 436 684 
0.65 231 435 666   0.65 18 31 49 
0.675 154 399 553           
0.7 238 699 937           
0.75 114 286 400           
0.775 60 243 303           
0.8 79 259 338           
0.85 10 36 46           
 Total           3,814           5,754         9,568     Total             494             672     1,166  
         Note: the common support option has been selected Note: the common support option has been selected 
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Annex VII: Data Description and Sources 
Data has been obtained from two surveys in Malawi conducted by the National Statistical Office, 
Zomba. These include the Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) conducted in 2004/05 and a 
follow-up survey conducted in May 2007. The following is a description of the data used in the study: 
Table 10: Data Description for Variables Used 
Variable Name Variable Label Binary 
rexppc Annual Household real expenditure   
lrexppc Natural log of Annual Household real expenditure   
TIP Householder Received a Starter Pack (TIP) as safety net from Government  yes 
agext Field Assistant resides in Community yes 
agextcp Householder receives advice from field assistant on general crop production yes 
agextsv Householder receives advice from field assistant on new seed varieties yes 
agextfu Householder receives advice from field assistant on fertiliser use yes 
agextirri Householder receives advice from field assistant on irrigation yes 
agextac Householder receives advice from field assistant on general animal care yes 
agextmkt Householder receives advice from field assistant on marketing/crop sales yes 
agextcre Householder receives advice from field assistant on access to credit yes 
p_tobauction Average price of tobacco in district at auction floors MK/kg   
p_maize Average price of maize in district MK/kg   
p_fert Average price of fertiliser in district MK/kg   
p_ganyu Average hire  price of ganyu labor in district MK/day   
p_index Average price index of miscellaneous consumables   
p_char Average price of charcoal in district   
p_ker Average price of kerosene in district   
p_tpt Average price of transport in district   
p_mflour Average price of maize flour in district MK/kg   
p_dwage Average price of casual/ganyu labor in district MK/day   
hhage Age of Household Head   
fadult HH: Females 15-64 years of age   
madult HH: Males 15-64 years of age   
mlgtp Householder uses paraffin for lighting fuel yes 
mlgte Householder uses electricity for lighting yes 
mcooke Householder uses electricity for cooking yes 
mcookf Householder uses firewood for cooking yes 
mcookc Householder uses charcoal for cooking yes 
fhh Householder is female (0/1) yes 
yrsed years of education   
inter Interaction term between fhh and yrsed   
elderly H: Individuals 65+ years of age   
illness Householder or wife had a serious illness that prevented participation in activities yes 
farmszpc Total land holding per person   
l_index Livestock index based on principal components analysis   
water Householder has access to personal water supply yes 
wbeing Householder considers wellbeing in year improved 0/1 yes 
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Variable Name Variable Label Binary 
distmkt distance (km) to nearest daily market   
reside Urban/Rural dummy yes 
roadbin1 road==Tar/Asphalt Graded yes 
roadbin3 road==Dirt Road (maintained) yes 
roadbin4  road==Dirt track yes 
agcredit Existence of Farmers credit clubs in community yes 
coop Existence of Farmers cooperatives in community yes 
irriscm Irrigation scheme in community yes 
mktsmall Access to a Daily Market in community yes 
mktlarge Access to a Larger Market in community yes 
rain_l For growing maize, the amount of rain was too little yes 
rain_m For growing maize, the amount of rain was too much yes 
season1 Interview took place in the months of Dec, Jan, Feb yes 
season2 Interview took place in the months of March, April, May yes 
season4 Interview took place in the months of Sept, Oct, Nov yes 
year2004 Interview took place in 2004 yes 
psu Enumeration Area/PSU (564 total)   
hhwght IHS2 HH weight   
hhsize HH Size (based on household members    
strata Stratum: district & urban/rural (30 total)   
aissf Householder received both basal and top dressing subsidy fertilizer in 2006/07 yes 
p_lmaize Average price of local maize in district MK/kg in 2006/07   
p_hmaize Average price of hybrid maize in district MK/kg in 2006/07   
p_tobacco Average price of burley tobacco in district MK/kg in 2006/07   
p_wage Average wage of casual/ganyu labour in district MK/day in 2006/07   
consyr Householder considers food consumption inadequate in 2006/07 yes 
 
